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COMMENTS
STERILIZATION REGULATION: GOVERNMENT
EFFORTS TO GUARANTEE INFORMED CONSENT
INTRODUCTION

As the legal and medical right to an elective sterilization
developed and more women and men chose sterilization' as a
method of family planning, 2 increased attention focused on the
actual voluntariness of such sterilizations. At the center of this
controversy is the doctrine of informed consent3 and the recent
federal and state legislative efforts to codify it.
The outcry over sterilizations had its origins in statistical
studies which seemed to indicate that some of the "voluntary"
sterilizations being performed and funded by government programs4 were in fact coerced by physicians, particularly those
1. Elective sterilization can be:
Nontherapeutic:Primary purpose of the procedure is to render an otherwise fertile
person permanently incapable of producing offspring.
Therapeutic: An elective procedure performed for prevention of a future pregnancy which would be life-threatening to the mother because of existing illness or
injury.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 51163(1)(A)-(B), 70037.1(1)(A)-(B) (1977).
2. AM. J. OBsTETmcs & GYNECOLOGY 1076 (1972). At one major teaching hospital,
The Women's Hospital of the Los Angeles County Medical Center, the following increase in the number of sterilization procedures occurred in the two-year interval
between July 1968 and July 1970:
Elective Hysterectomy
742% increase
Elective Tubal Ligation
470% increase
Tubal Ligation after Delivery
151% increase
From 1970 to 1973 the total number of vasectomies performed in this country rose
from 200,000 per year to almost 1 million per year.
Added to an estimated 1 million female sterilizations a year, a total of 2 million
people in this country are undergoing surgical sterilization each year. Westhoff &
Jones, Contraceptionand Sterilizationin the United States, 1965-1975, 9 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 153, 155 (July/Aug. 1977). Sterilization is now the single most popular method of birth control for couples married ten years or more. Among couples who
have had all the children they want, sterilization clearly dominates the field.
3. The doctrine that a doctor must impart some quantum of medical information
relevant to a proposed treatment which is sufficient to enable a patient to make an
intelligent choice as to whether to undergo such treatment. D. HARNEY, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE

58 (1973).

4. Title XIX of the Social Security Act provides for federal matching of funds
for reimbursements for sterilizations. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1970); id. §
1396d(a)(4)(C) (Supp. V 1975). Those provisions require State Medicaid plans to provide family planning services and supplies furnished to individuals of childbearing age
who are eligible under the State plan and who desire such services and supplies. The
Medicaid Bureau has not defined family planning services by regulation; however, the
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performed on minority women. These statistics pointed to a
tension between competing governmental policies; that of
making sterilizations freely available as a legitimate means of
family planning, and that of assuring that sterilizations were
performed with knowing and intelligent consent.5 Women's
groups, minority groups and medical groups have been actively
involved in the process of trying to strike a balance between the
two policies. In the midst of an intensive lobbying effort' and
skirmishes in the courtroom,7 officials in the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the California
State Department of Health have promulgated regulations
which emphasize attempting to guarantee informed consent
above all else.
This comment will describe the existing federal regulations,' the newly created California regulations,' and the proposed new federal regulations 9 on human sterilization in the
context of the legal doctrine on which the regulations depend-that of informed consent. It will examine the arguments
of various legal and political groups regarding the impact of
these regulations on other related legal and medical rights of
women. In particular an inquiry will be made as to whether,
policy has been to consider sterilization as a federally funded family planning service.
Title XX of the Social Security Act authorizes grants to the States for social
services, including family planning services. 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
The Public Health Service also funds sterilizations under Title X of the Public Health
Service Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a), 254c (Supp. V 1975).
5. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, HEW NEWS, NEWS RELEASE 1
(Dec. 1, 1977) (on file at Santa Clara L. Rev.).
6. The California Coalition for the Medical Rights of Women was formed in
August, 1974 for the purpose of making local and state public health agencies, private
practitioners, and the pharmaceutical and medical industries accountable to women
health consumers and health workers. The organization, claiming an umbrella membership of 2000 members, including the Comicion Femenil Mexicana, and Buena Vista
Women's Services and represented by the Women's Litigation Unit of the San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, 1095 Market, San Francisco 94103,
and Equal Rights Advocates, 1535 Mission, San Francisco, was instrumental in getting
the new state regulations promulgated. The coalition first urged the state to issue
comprehensive guidelines to insure informed consent. It then filed an administrative
petition under Government Code section 11426 followed by negotiations with the
Dept. of Health and the California Medical Association. Amicus Brief for Intervenors,
Exhibit F, California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed July
18, 1977) [on file with Public Advocates Inc., San Francisco, Cal.].
7. The California Medical Association filed suit against Jerome Lackner, Director of the State Department of Health. Their suit for a preliminary injunction was
denied July 25, 1977, and summary judgment was granted Lackner in April, 1978.
California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 21, 1977).
8. 45 C.F.R. § 205.35 (1977); 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.201- 50.204 (1977).
9. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 51163(1)(A)-(B), 70037.1(A)-(B) (1977).
10. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,718 (1977).
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first, the guarantee of informed consent to a non-therapeutic
sterilization will have an adverse effect on the unimpeded exercise of a woman's right to obtain a sterilization under the constitutional right of privacy," and secondly, whether this guarantee of informed consent will jeopardize medical safety by
creating a greater medical risk to women in a substantial number of situations. 2 Finally, this comment will examine the effects of the California regulations on civil tort law in the context of a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed
consent to a sterilization procedure.
THE HEART OF THE CONTROVERSY

The Right to Elective Sterilization
In California, there is a legal right to an elective sterilization after the informed consent of the patient has been obtained. 3 While there is no statute affirmatively declaring it,
the right has been firmly established by Jessin v. County of
Shasta," and an overlay of "fundamental right" decisions by
the United States Supreme Court. 5
Prior to Jessin, in the absence of affirmative law declaring
elective sterilization legal or illegal, physicians were often reluctant to perform such operations." Although now legal, hospitals or physicians are not compelled to perform sterilizations.
In fact there can still be difficulty in persuading a doctor to do
11. The meaning of the constitutionally based right to privacy was explained in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Court invalidated a Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute. Justice Douglas traced the origin and development of
the privacy doctrine through constitutional text and court decisions. The Court ruled
that the Constitution protects certain private areas of activity against state interference.
12. The focus of this comment is on elective sterilization of women, although the
regulations apply equally to sterilizations of men and other procedures which happen
to result in sterilization.
13. S. BESERRA & S. FRANKUN, SEX CODE OF CAUFORNIA 17 (1977).
14. 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1969).
15. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
16. Fear of legal consequences, whether real or imagined, probably resulted in
restrictive regulations regarding voluntary sterilizations. For example, 1) the ageparity formula restricting sterilizations to older women or to young women with many
children. Age times number of children had to equal 120; 2) approval by hospital
sterilization committees fearful of liability for such things as mayhem; 3) approval
by spouse. (Clearly no longer allowed under Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)). Comment, A Woman's Right To Voluntary Sterilization,
22 BUFFALO L. REv. 291, 296-98 (1972).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

974

[Vol. 18

a sterilization in certain situations. 7 However, if the doctor
practices in a clinic or hospital which does permit elective sterilizations, (s)he may not refuse to perform the operation for nonmedical reasons. 18
Informed Consent
At the heart of both this right to elective sterilization and
of the controversy surrounding the sterilization regulations is
the question of the consent of the patient. Defining competent
consent to ensure that an elective sterilization is really voluntary poses a problem. It is in response to that problem that the
already developing doctrine of informed consent continues to
be interpreted and debated. Informed consent is one of the
most frequently encountered expressions in medical malpractice literature; however, it has been troublesome for the courts
to ascertain its true essence.' 9
The basic tenet of informed consent is that a physician
who proposes a medical procedure has an obligation to explain
the procedure to the patient and disclose the dangers incident
to the procedure so the patient can make an intelligent and
informed choice whether to consent.2 0 The California Supreme
Court described the physician's duty in Cobbs v. Grant,2'
where it held that: "as an integral part of the physician's overall obligation to the patient there is a duty of reasonable disclosure of the available choices with respect to proposed therapy
and of the dangers inherently and potentially involved in
each.""
This general statement of the physician's duty does not
provide any hard and fast rules concerning the quantum of
medical information which must be supplied when discussing
a proposed procedure.23 That quantum required could range
17.

Id. A physician is reluctant to perform a sterilization on a young woman or

man in the fear that they will have later regrets.

18. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1258 (West Supp. 1977). See note 16 supra
for examples of non-medical criteria imposed prior to passage of this code section.
19. D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 58 (1973); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (the scope of the physician's communication is to be measured
by the patient's need); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 11 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) (physician
must disclose all the known material risks peculiar to the proposed procedure); Fogel
v. Genesee Hospital, 41 App. Div. 2d 17, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973) (must be a reasonable
disclosure of the known dangers incident to the proposed treatment).
20. D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, 2 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 594.43 (1977).
21. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
22. Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
23. D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 58 (1973).
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from an amount determined by professional judgment 2' to complete disclosure of any and all facts and dangers however re-

mote.2
Cobbs rejected both extremes"6 and emerged as a variation
of the medical community standard which requires disclosure
of all information normally disclosed by physicians in a similar
field of practice in the same or similar community."
For a complex procedure, Cobbs"requires, at a minimum,
the disclosure of the potential for death or serious harm and an
explanation in lay terms of the complications that might
occur. 8 Beyond this, a doctor must also reveal to the patient
such additional information as a skilled practitionerof good
standing would provide under similarcircumstances." The reasonableness of the disclosure is measured both by the patient's
need and by the community standard. 0
Use of the community standard has both procedural and
evidentiary effects. Under Cobbs, if the plaintiff proves less
than the minimum disclosure for a complicated procedure,
expert testimony is not needed. But when the minimum disclosure is made, the plaintiff must produce expert testimony on
whether the community standard has been met. 3' The standard
might require such additional information as the risks involved
in alternative methods of treatment or in a decision to forego
24. The doctrine of informed consent was developed to get around this notion.
However, the therapeutic privilege is retained in most jurisdictions, providing that a
physician need not disclose those things which would upset the patient to the point of
foregoing necessary treatment. Canterbury v. Spence rejects this privilege as inconsistent with the principle that the patient should make the choice. The therapeutic privilege is viewed as a paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent simply
because divulgence may prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the
patient really needs. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
25. Canterbury v. Spence comes closest to this but tempers by saying "all risks
potentially affecting the decision must be unmasked." 464 F.2d at 787.
26. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
1) Unlimited discretion in the physician is irreconcilable with the basic right of
the patient to make the ultimate informed decision regarding the course of treatment
to which he knowledgeably consents to be subjected. 8 Cal. 3d at 242, 502 P.2d at 9,
104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
2) The patient's interest in information does not extend to a lengthy polysyllabic
discourse on all possible complications. . . .And, there is no physician's duty to discuss the relatively minor risks inherent in the common procedures when it is common
knowledge that such risks inherent in the procedure are of very low incidence. 8 Cal.
3d at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
27. D. LouisELL & H. WILLIAMS, 2 MEDICAL MALPRACTCE 594.48 (1977).
28. 8 Cal. 3d at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
29. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
30. Id.
31. D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, 2 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 594.48 (1977).
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any treatment, and the likelihood of success. The materiality
of the information to the decision "is a nonmedical judgment
reserved to the patient alone" 3 and likewise would be within
the province of lay knowledge (the jury) in a trial.
In addition to establishing the community standard,
Cobbs specifically enumerated the defenses available to the
physician. The doctor need not disclose risks when the patient
asks not to be informed or when the doctor can demonstrate
that disclosure would so seriously have upset the patient that
the patient would not have been able to dispassionately weigh
the risks of refusing to undergo the recommended treatment.
The second ground is commonly referred to as the therapeutic
privilege.

With respect to elective sterilization, the rule announced
in Cobbs would require a physician to explain other possible
methods of birth control, the relative dangers of each, and the
specific nature and result and possible complications of the
sterilization operation. For a treatment not designed to produce sterilization but which could result in sterilization, the
physician must disclose that possible result and explain alternatives, if any. If a physician fails to disclose those things, the
plaintiff must prove a causal relationship between lack of disclosure and the injury. The test is objective: what would a
prudent person in the patient's position have decided if adequately informed of all significant perils.3 This objective test
has great significance to the sterilization issue because many
complaints arise from an alleged failure to inform the patient
of the irreversible nature of the operation. These complaints,
when coupled with various statistical studies, became the impetus behind the passage of federal and state regulations governing elective sterilizations.
HISTORY OF THE REGULATIONS

In 1973 and 1974 statistics began to show a great increase
in the number of people, men and women, seeking sterilization
as a means of birth control. 35 Private studies conducted in var32. 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
33. Id. at 246, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516. Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957), was the first
modern case to articulate what have become the standard defenses in an informed
consent case.
34. 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16.
35. Westhoff & Jones, Contraception& Sterilization in the United States, 19651975, in 9 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 153 (July/August 1977).
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ious large urban training hospitals showed that the percentage
of women, particularly ethnic and racial minority women, sterilized under federal programs had increased dramatically."
The suspicion drawn from those statistics led to further study,
interviewing, and investigation, resulting in charges that doctors either neglected to explain the operation and its permanence properly, or performed sterilizations without securing the
3
woman's permission.
Various abuses were reported, including allegations that
sterilization, preferably hysterectomies," were performed to
provide young surgical residents with training and that doctors
"sold" women on sterilization and even threatened them with
withholding medical services or future denial of welfare benefits. 39 One study of doctors' attitudes presumably exhibited
their readiness to persuade minority and poor women to be
sterilized because they all had too many children anyway, most
of which would end up as a drain on the welfare rolls.40 As the
number of reported abuses increased, medical rights groups
called for some restrictions on sterilization "abuse." ' 41
In 1973 a lawsuit involving federally funded family planning programs focused national attention on the problem of
coerced sterilization of mental incompetents, minors and welfare recipients.42 The case, Relf v. Weinberger, 3 involved three
mentally retarded sisters who had been coerced into sterilization. The court's decision took note of the "uncontroverted
evidence"44 that indefinite numbers of poor people have been
improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization operation
under the threat that various federally supported welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they submit to irreversible ster45
ilization.
36. B. Rosenfeld, S. Wolfe & R. McGarrah, A Health Research Group Study on
Surgical Sterilization: Present Abuses & Proposed Regulations (Oct. 29, 1973). (unpublished, Health Research Group, 2000 P. St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).
37. Skane, Health's Embattled Lackner-anything but an administrator,8 CAL.
J. 55 (1977).
38. A tubal ligation is the cutting or tying of the fallopian tubes. A hysterectomy
is the surgical removal of the entire uterus.
39. B. Rosenfeld, S. Wolfe & R. McGarrah, supra note 36.
40. Hernandez, Chicanos and the Issue of Involuntary Sterilization, 3 CHIcANo
L. REv. 3, 31 (1976).
41. Randal, Nader Group Hits Sterilization "Sell", Washington Star News, Oct.
31, 1973, at A-23 (refers to the Health Research Group's efforts).
42. See note 4 supra.
43. 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974).
44. Id. at 1199.
45. Id. This "uncontroverted evidence" was supplied by the doctors who had
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Although initial regulations on sterilization restrictions
had been promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW)," the effective date of those regulations
was delayed pending the Reif litigation.' On March 15, 1974,
the district court in Reif entered its judgment declaring that
the regulations did not go far enough in implementing the congressional command that sterilization be voluntary and not
coerced' 8 and ordering their revision. The only specific guideline imposed by the court was the requirement that the consent
document prominently display the guarantee that no federal
benefits can be withdrawn because of a failure to accept sterilization.'
Pursuant to Reif, interim federal regulations were in effect
by April, 19 74 .50 More stringent than the court had ordered, the
interim regulations defined informed consent in detail," provided for an auditor-witness," required a consent document
prominently displaying the guarantee of no withholding of federal benefits," and provided that no federally funded nontherapeutic sterilization could be performed sooner than
seventy-two hours following the giving of informed consent."
These interim regulations remain in effect today following the
appeal of Reif. 55 In order to continue receiving federal funds for
its Medi-Cal patients, California followed with similar regulations for federally funded non-therapeutic sterilizations.
In the aftermath of Reif, citizens groups, using both the
judicial and legislative processes, pressured for even stronger
reported the abuses mentioned above: B. Rosenfeld, S. Wolfe & R. McGarrah, supra
note 36, at 3-9. Dr. Rosenfeld filed an affidavit in the Reif case.
46. 42 C.F.R. § 50.210-.214 (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 205.35 (1977).
47. 42 C.F.R. § 50.201-.204 (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 205.35 (1977).
48. 372 F. Supp. at 1201.
49. Id., at 1203.
50. 42 C.F.R. § 50.201-.204 (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 205.35 (1977). A moratorium
ordered by the court in Reif on sterilization of people under twenty-one or who are
legally incapable of consenting was continued and the regulations applied only to
persons legally capable of consenting to a sterilization.
51. 42 C.F.R. § 50.202(d) (1977); 45 C.F.R. 205.35(a)(i) (1977).
52. 42 C.F.R. § 50.202(d)(7)(ii) (1977); 45 C.F.R. 205.35(a)(2)(1)(F)(2) (1977).
53. 42 C.F.R. § 50.202(d)(7)(iii) (1977); 45 C.F.R. 205.35(a)(1)(i)(B) (1977).
54. 42 C.F.R. § 50.203(c) (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 205.35(a)(1)(iii) (1977).
55. The case was mooted on appeal and dismissed. Both sides were satisfied with
the interim regulations and the plans for issuing new regulations via the rulemaking
process. Relf v. Weinberger, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
56. 45 C.F.R. § 205.35(3) (1978). A state plan under the Social Security Act must
also comply with the federal requirements with respect to sterilization procedures and
the state agency shall report to the Secretary of HEW every year the number of
sterilizations performed according to the informed consent procedure.
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regulations. In California, legal pressure took the form of a
lawsuit against the U.S.C.-L.A. County Medical Center,5 7 alleging that many low income Chicano women, confined, under
sedation and/or in labor, were coerced into tubal ligations. 5 On
the legislative side, women's health and legal groups organized
and helped in the drafting of State Department of Health regulations that would apply to all elective sterilizations performed
in acute care hospitals, not just those funded with public
funds. 9 After public hearings, redrafting, and negotiating, such
regulations were added, effective December 1, 1977.0
The very day the California regulations went into effect,
the federal government issued proposed rules changing the federal regulations in four major ways." The proposed rules require an interpreter if the consent form is not in the primary
language of the patient; a thirty day waiting period between
the date of the consent and the date of the sterilization; a
minimum age of twenty-one to participate in the consent process, and elimination of federal financial assistance for hysterectomies performed solely for the purpose of rendering an individual permanently incapable of reproducing.2 Hearings for
public comment on these proposed rules were held until March
13, 1978.03
Because the federal sterilization regulations are closely
mirrored by state regulations and the proposed federal changes
are still awaiting release, the focus here will be on the basic
provisions of the California regulations.
57. No. 75-2057 (C.D. Cal., filed June 18, 1975).
58. Id.; see also pleadings on file at Public Advocates Inc., 1536 Mission St., San
Francisco, Cal. 94103. There is dispute over why the federal regulations then in effect
did not cover the situation. One side argues the regulations were not complied with.
McGarrah, Sterilization Without Consent: Teaching Hospital Violations of HEW Regulations (Jan. 21, 1975) (on file at Santa Clara L. Rev.). The other side claims that
the federal regulations were not distributed to hospitals by Lackner, head of the California State Dept. of Health. There is also acknowledgement by the Circuit Court in
Relf that HEW was unable to adequately supervise the procurement of consent, raising
questions as to HEW's enforcement of the interim regulations and its capacity to
enforce revised regulations.
59. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 70037.1 (1977). These sections apply to general
acute care hospitals. Any sterilization performed in an acute care hospital is subject
to the regulations.
60. 21 C.M.A. NEws, No. 51 (Nov. 18, 1977).
61. These would revise 45 C.F.R. § 205 and 42 C.F.R. § 50 (1977).
62. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,718 (1977).
63. Id.
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THE BASIC REGULATORY PROVISIONS

The State of California has two basic sets of sterilization
regulations: one covering Medi-Cal patients and one covering
health facilities, applicable to all sterilizations performed
therein."
Types of Sterilizations
5
Both sets of regulations define the types of sterilizations.1
For a sterilization other than an emergency, the following conditions must be met. First, the patient must be advised, prior
to solicitation of the informed consent, that no benefits provided by public programs may be withdrawn or withheld by
reason of a decision not to be sterilized; second, a minimum
required waiting period of fourteen days must have passed
since the signing of the Sterilization Consent Document. The
patient may request a shorter period in writing but in no case
less than seventy-two hours. Third, the patient's informed consent must be obtained. In order to participate in the informed
consent process a patient may not be in a physical condition
or mental state in which judgment is significantly altered,
whether due to medication, emotional state or impaired sensorium, or in labor, or less than twenty-four hours postpartum or
post abortion."
Additionally, a patient may select or waive selection of an
auditor-witness who, if selected, will be present during the informed consent process. The informed consent may be obtained by either a physician or the physician's designee. The
sterilization operation must be requested by the patient without fraud, duress, or undue influence. If the patient is not
fluent in either English or Spanish, the Sterilization Consent
Document must be verbally translated into a language in
which the patient is fluent."

Explanation of Medical Procedure
Under the regulations the patient must be given an explanation of the proposed procedure and the anticipated result
64. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 51163-51305.7 (1977); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22,
§§ 70037.1-70736 (1977).
65. Id. §§ 51163, 70037.1 (Elective, Secondary and Emergency Sterlizations).
66. Id. §§ 51305.2, 70702.1.
67. Id. §§ 51305.3(e), 70707.3(e) (1977). This was changed from the original draft
which provided that the patient supply the translator.
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including but not limited to: 1) the surgical procedure to be
used and how sterilization results therefrom; 2) the type of
anesthesia to be used; 3) approximate length of hospital stay;
4) approximate length of time for recovery; 5) the effectiveness
of the procedure in producing permanent and irreversible sterilization; 6) whether the procedure is new or experimental; 7)
the financial cost to the patient; and 8) confirmed and/or suspected short and long term consequences, including but not
limited to anticipated results of permanent and irreversible
sterilization, common side effects and discomforts, significant
health risks and complications."
Age Requirement
A person must be at least eighteen years of age to give
informed consent to an elective sterilization whether therapeutic or non-therapeutic." Additionally, the patient must be provided with the booklet, "Patients Information on Female Sterilization," developed by the Department of Health and available in both English and Spanish. If the patient is not fluent
in either language, the booklet must be read to her in a language in which the patient is fluent.70
Sanctions
Sanctions for noncompliance under the Medi-Cal sections
are nonpayment for the sterilization services and a referral to
the Board of Medical Quality Assurance.7' Hospitals are to
verify the sterilizations performed in their facilities, reporting
the numbers and types of sterilizations to the Department of
Health quarterly. They are also required to report the name of
any physician not complying to the Board of Medical Quality
Assurance. 2 The sanction for noncompliance is the possibility
of revocation or involuntary suspension of the hospital's li73
cense.
68.

Id. § 51305.3(a)-(h), 70707.3(a)-(h). This section is the basic definition of

informed consent to a sterilization.
69. Id. § 51305.5(1), 70707.5(1). This is an additional requirement for elective
sterilization. The federal age requirement is 21. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,728 (1977). This prohi-

bition against sterilization of minors was declared invalid by the trial court in California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner. California Medical Ass'n Executive's Memo No. 685

(May 1, 1978).
70. Id. §§ 51305.5(6), 70707.5(6).
71. Id. § 51305.7(a)-.7(b).
72. Id. §§ 70707.8, 70736.
73. Id. § 70707.8.
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Despite the public pressure for increased regulation of sterilizations, a basic question still persists: Has the right to a
sterilization been denied or abused often enough to warrant
official regulation of the doctor/patient relationship by the
state? The medical profession argues that the regulations are
more than a set of safeguards designed to protect the medical
rights of women, but rather form a giant wedge in the door of
overall government regulation of the practice of medicine.
Opponents of the regulations argue that they do more harm
than good in the very area which they are aimed at aiding-women's medical and legal rights." The National Organization for Women joins in the latter argument. 5
In the face of these two contentions, the regulations should
be further scrutinized to see what impact they have on the right
of the patient to seek an elective sterilization and, perhaps
more importantly, on the medical well-being of the patient
they are designed to protect.
EFFECT OF THE REGULATIONS ON THE AVAILABILITY OF
STERILIZATION

The ConstitutionalRight
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the federal constitution reserves to the individual rights of reproductive choice. Emphasizing that legislation relating to human
procreation "involves one of the basic civil rights of man,"" the
Supreme Court has invoked the fourteenth amendment and
the privacy doctrine" to invalidate state legislation which limited individual rights of choice in matters of human reproduction." Collectively, these decisions affirm the fundamental
character of the right of individuals to choose whether they will
74. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 16, California Medical
Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 260899 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 18, 1977) (on file at SANTA
CLARA

L.

REV.).

75. See Letter from Katherine F. Carson, Task Force Coordinator for NOW on
Sterilization, to Marlene Prendergast (Jan. 25, 1977) (on file at Santa Clara L. Ray.).
The national organization has a very pro-sterilization platform. They do not want to
see any restrictions on that right. The state NOW has changed its position on the
regulations to a support position after a workshop meeting in November 1977. The
state organization does not include San Francisco or San Diego. San Francisco NOW
has testified in favor of the regulations.
76. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 535-41 (1942).
77. See note 11 supra.
78. See note 15 supra. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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or will not bear children.'
The court's affirmation of individual rights in this area
necessarily reduces governmental authority to intermeddle.80
In Eisenstadtv. Baird,8 Justice Brennan speaking for the court
succinctly framed this principle when he said: "If the right to
privacy means anything it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion in matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."8
Burdens on the Right
There is no disagreement on the existence of a woman's
fundamental right to choose whether to bear children. The debate is over how the sterilization regulations affect that
right-positively or adversely.
Proponents argue that the regulations serve a compelling
state interest by insuring that the right to procreation is not
taken away without informed consent. This view is based on
the conclusion that scattered studies, reported abuses, and
anecdotal evidence reflect wide-scale sterilization abuse by the
medical profession. Or in more graphic terms, they reflect
"genocide against the minority poor" 3 in order to avoid the
social costs of unwanted indigent children.
Despite these arguments, systematic data on sterilization
abuse remains extremely difficult to collect. There is no mechanism whereby instances of abuse may be regularly and systematically identified.8 ' Additionally, there is also difficulty in
defining "abuse" in this context. Because thousands are being
sterilized does not necessarily prove that thousands are being
coerced into sterilization. It is more likely that more and more
women, including ethnic and racial minorities, desire sterilization because it is the best and easiest way for many to avoid
more children. Individual case histories,85 no matter how com79.
80.

See note 78 supra.
Pilpel & Patton, Abortion, Conscience and the Constitution:An Examina-

tion of FederalInstitutional Conscience Clauses, 6 COLUM.

HUMAN RIGHTS

L. Rzv. 279,

281 (1974-75).
81. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
82. Id. at 453.
83. CAL. J., Oct. 1977 at 343.
84. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,719 (1977).
85. See B. Rosenfeld, S. Wolfe & R. McGarrah, supra note 36. See also C. Westhoff & E. Jones, Contraception & Sterlization in the United States, 1965-1975, in 9
FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECnVES 153 (July/Aug. 1977).
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pelling, may not accurately portray the actual consequences of
alternative policy choices.
Even if the proponents' contentions support the need for
some regulation, the regulations as they exist may be excessive.
Arguably, they constitute an unwarranted interference with
the exercise of a fundamental right since their burdensome
provisions make sterilizations more difficult to obtain for all
women, especially for those whose protection was the primary
intent.
General regulatory burdens. The general thrust of the regulations is negative toward sterilization. The regulations require that each patient be given a booklet, developed by the
Department of Health with no input from physicians, which
describes the operations. While frank disclosure of the permanent results is necessary, the booklet makes the procedures
sound overly threatening. Its "Don't Be Sorry" approach comes
over too heavy." A patient with the most positive attitude
would be inhibited. While careful thought on the matter is
good, being frightened is not. After all, the complications of
pregnancy and childbirth can be much worse. 7
The regulations put a burden on the patient and the doctor
requiring both to place form over substance. Typically, a
woman and her doctor discuss alternative post-delivery birth
control methods late in the pregnancy. At that time, the
woman indicates whether or not she chooses to be sterilized
after delivery. The consent forms would be signed upon admission to the hospital without coercion or hard sell. Now, under
the regulations, both patient and doctor will be concerned with
missing a deadline and getting the forms executed early, perhaps with less thought on the substance of the decision.
By suggesting it is more dangerous than other surgery, the
regulations similarly burden the choice involved in selecting
one form of medical treatment. For example, these restrictive
procedures will not be required for most male sterilizations
since a vasectomy can and is usually performed in a doctor's
office whereas female sterilization is a hospital procedure. 8
86.

See

CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH, WHAT ABOUT STERILIZATION? PATIENTS INFORMA-

[on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.J.
C. Tietz, J. Bongaarts & B. Schearer, Mortality Associated with the Control

TION ON FEMALE STERILIZATION 18

87.

of Fertility, in 8

FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES

6 (Jan./Feb. 1976). A graph indicates

that of all the methods of controlling fertility, no method, i.e., pregnancy, has the
greatest number of deaths associated with it, in all ages except women 40-44 when oral
contraceptives cause greater danger. Id. at 10.
88. Brief for Plaintiff at 59, California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099
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Additionally, no similar procedure or mandatory delay is required for other permanent and irreversible surgery for which
general informed consent has been considered sufficient.
In addition to the burdens the regulations place on women
seeking sterilizations, the regulations may generally inhibit
physicians, causing them to be less willing to perform the procedure. The deadlines and minimum waiting period, needless
state defined recitation of "informed consent," the provision
for a translator, and additional forms are viewed by many physicians as burdens on good medical care. In the face of these
considerations private physicians may simply refuse to perform
sterilizations. Having to search for willing doctors will make
access to the right to sterilization more difficult for the patient.
Specific regulatory burdens. Specific provisions of the regulations may also pose problems for women seeking elective
sterilizations. For example, the various waiting periods of
seventy-two hours, fourteen days or thirty days could conceivably limit a woman's access to sterilization. Thus, if a pregnant
woman wishing to be sterilized immediately after delivery delivers prematurely, before valid consent forms are executed, no
sterilization could be performed. Similarly, a woman who had
thought about sterilization and reaches a final decision at the
time of labor would not be permitted a sterilization.
The regulations also state that the sterilization must be
voluntarily requested by the patient. If a physician must wait
for a request and the request comes too late, there can be no
sterilization. Furthermore, consider the possibility of a woman
who is unaware of the waiting period and wants to arrange
sterilization surgery during a vacation period or another time
period when she is off work. Even though she may have reached
this decision after years of consideration, if the properly executed sterilization consent document is not filed in time to
meet hospital surgery schedules, the result is no sterilization.
This seemingly unwarranted denial of the right to an elective
sterilization could be a frequent occurrence given the existence
of regulatory provisions calling for a thirty-day waiting period
and disallowing consent obtained during labor."
The vagueness of the impaired judgment provision could
also produce real dilemmas. For example, a woman, hysterical
(Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 18, 1977) (statement of Katherine Carson, M.D.) [on file
at SANTA CLARA L. REV.]; id., at 77 (statement of Stanley Brossman, M.D.).
89. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,719, at § 50.203(c) (1977). CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §
51305.3(a)(2) (1977).
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at discovering an unwanted pregnancy, might desire an abortion and sterilization at the same time. However, she would
likely be in an "altered emotional state" ' and thus not capable
of rendering informed consent, again resulting in no sterilization. Similarly, a woman who desires sterilization upon delivery and executes the consent forms while in the hospital for
pregnancy related problems (convulsions, bleeding) for which
she is taking medication will get no sterilization and if such
medication significantly alters her judgment and she cannot
give an informed consent. No sterilization.
The statutory requirement of an auditor-witness, unless
waived, poses additional problems. It forces a patient to take
positive action in order to make fundamentally private decisions in private. As a result, the state requires a patient to
affirmatively assert her right to privacy, a right it should have
the burden of protecting.
The age minimums give rise to an equally wide variety of
questions, such as problems surrounding discrepancy of treatment among patients, and unavailability of sterilization to a
particular group. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare has adopted twenty-one as the age at which a person
is capable of giving a voluntary consent to sterilization within
the meaning of the family planning statutes. The department
admits that any choice of age limit is imperfect, 9 but since a
line must be drawn somewhere, it opts for the higher limit and
sets it by federal law.
Since the states have varying definitions of capacity to
give informed consent (for example, California sets it at age
eighteen), determination of capacity by resort to state law
would produce the anomalous result of the federal government
withholding funds for a sterilization of a twenty-year-old in one
state while funding sterilization of younger people in others.2
It would be costly and impractical to mandate case-by-case
inquiries into the maturity and judgment of prospective patients.
However, a single federal standard necessarily divides people into two groups: those over the minimum age for whom
funds are made available and those below it, from whom funds
are withheld. Despite the unequal treatment, the twenty-one22, §§ 51305.3(a)(1), 70707.3(a)(1) (1977).

90.

CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.

91.
92.

42 Fed. Reg. 62,719 (1977).
42 Fed. Reg. 62,723 (1977).
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year-old age limit is probably constitutional."t Nevertheless,
this age barrier will cause hardship and possibly the unavailability of sterilizations to a sizeable age group. There is no provision for sterilization below the minimum age under extraordinary circumstances. The person who wants and needs the sterilization can be as tragic a story as the person who gets one
although not sure she wanted one. 4 The discrepancy in minimum age under the federal regulations (twenty-one) and the
California regulations (eighteen) will cause unequal treatment
between those dependent on public funds and therefore subject
to the federal limit, and those paying for their own sterilization,
unless California decides to completely fund the sterilizations
of eighteen to twenty-one year olds1 5
The more liberal California eighteen-year-old age requirement presents questions also. No exception is provided for minors who are married or have attained an emancipated status.
However, several code sections recognize a right of those minors
to consent to any medical treatment. 6 Thus, the regulations
seem to directly contradict existing state law.
Effect on Medical Well-Being
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the basic regulatory
provisions seriously inhibit the availability of elective steriliza93. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Voe v. Califano, 434 F. Supp. 1058
(D. Conn. 1977).
94. Voe v. Califano, 434 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Conn. 1977). The suit involved a 20year-old woman suing to obtain public funding for a sterilization operation. "The case
Iwasi an unhappy blend of compelling circumstances, ironic administrative regulations, and uncertain judicial standards." Id. at 1059.
The plaintiff, at 20, had been pregnant ten times. She had two children, aged 2
and 1, a third child dying within hours of birth. She had one miscarriage and six
abortions.
After concluding the 21 year age barrier was constitutional, the judge made a plea
to other agencies of government to hear the "poignant cry" for relief. Id. at 1063. "If
lalli possibilities fail, it is reasonable to hope that somewhere in this State there is a
doctor and a hospital and, if necessary, some private benefactor, willing to arrange for
the medical procedure this plaintiff earnestly seeks." Id. at 1063.
95. This is unlikely due to recent Supreme Court decisions on funding of abortion
which leave states in the position of choosing whether or not to fund Medicaid abortions. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See also San Francisco Chronicle, July 5,
1978, at 1 (California Legislature voted to dramatically restrict state-paid abortions
similar to the federal standards).
96. CAL. Civ. CODE § 25.7 (West Supp. 1978) (minors on active military duty);
id. § 25.6 (married minors); id. § 34.5 (prevention or treatment of pregnancy) (sterilization specifically excepted); id. § 34.6 (emancipated minor fifteen years or older living
away from home). Apparently the court in California Medical As'n v. Lackner agreed.
See note 69 supra.
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tion by excessively burdening the patient's right to choose that
treatment. The regulations inhibit the availability of elective
sterilization in another fashion as well. They create a variety
of medical risks for the patient in operations, making it even
more unlikely that a woman will undergo the procedure.
Initially, the waiting period under the regulations will
cause greater medical risk to women in certain circumstances.
The waiting period will create situations requiring two hospitalizations and therefore two general anesthetics. This unnecessarily produces greater risk and greater cost to the patient.
For example, when it becomes clear at the time of a delivery by Caesarian section that another pregnancy would be life
threatening, a woman would be unable to give consent to a
tubal ligation at that point. This is something that cannot be
determined until delivery at which time the sterilization presents far less medical risk than later. To avoid this possibility,
doctors would have to get informed consent in advance from
every woman about to deliver a baby in case such a situation
should arise. This would produce ludicrous results for the majority of women who would experience undue concern about a
possible sterilization and about their doctor being an overzealous surgeon. 7
Similarly, a patient who wishes sterilization but delivers
her baby before the required consent forms are executed would
have to come back after fully recovering from one medically
risky situation to submit to another. Immediately after a normal delivery, a tubal ligation is technically easier for a physician to perform and far less risk is present to the patient than
the same operation at a later time." From this standpoint,
three days, fourteen days, thirty days, or a year are irrelevant.
The risk is less at the time of delivery.
Finally, a woman with postpartem bleeding caused from
the trauma of delivering an oversized infant might eventually
require a hysterectomy to correct the situation." In this situation, not an emergency, the consent for treatment producing
sterilization must be obtained seventy-two hours before the
treatment. While the patient bleeds, the physician must wait
out the three days, unduly endangering the patient.
97. Interview with Marvin Richards, M.D., Member, California Medical Association Committee on Evolving Trends in Society Affecting Life (March 1, 1978).
98. Id.
99. Id.: Brief for Plaintiff at 90, California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099
(Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 18, 1977) (declaration of Robert B. Domush, M.D.) [on
file at Santa Clara L. Rev.].
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Proponents admit the problems with risking a second
anesthetic for an elective sterilization but claim justification
for that in the protection from duress. Both sides seem to agree
that there is no way to safeguard both immediate freedom to
be sterilized and freedom from duress while deciding on a sterilization.'00

In addition to the attack on second anesthetics, the medical profession has criticized the soundness of applying the regulations in situations involving secondary sterilizations. In these
situations, where the patient is not seeking a sterilization but
such a risk is inherent in the surgical procedure, medical experts charge that the regulations in fact create greater risks for
patients.
For example, a patient with a severe pelvic inflammatory
disease such as a tubal abcess would call for treatment which
may involve a risk of sterilization such as removal of one or
both fallopian tubes.' 0 ' It is difficult if not impossible for the
physician to tell if this condition is life threatening and thus
could be classified as an emergency or if the procedure can
safely be delayed for the three-day waiting period.
Alternatively, consider the following absurd result. .

.

.A

woman with large hydrosalpingus (water in the fallopian tubes)
caused by previous gonorrhea needs a hysterectomy. She is
already sterile from the disease, but since the hysterectomy will
technically cause sterility, there must be compliance with the
consent process.'"'
Similarly, consider a woman with huge fibroids, a benign
tumor of the uterus which displaces enough tissue to produce
sterility, requiring a hysterectomy. The consent process grinds
in the fact of sterility still further, making it sound as though
the patient is choosing it when she is not.
Finally, suppose a woman is admitted to the hospital for
a laporatomy (abdominal surgery) with a suspected ovarian
mass. At the time of surgery, a malignant mass is discovered
on the uterus and is immediately removed by the surgeon without a seventy-two hour waiting period. In similar situations
Medi-Cal reviewers have concluded that no emergency existed
and that the waiting period should have been observed.""
100. Letter from Katherine F. Carson, supra note 75.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Brief for Plaintiff at 66, California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099
(Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 18, 1977) (declaration of Truman Katz, Administrator,
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, Cal.).
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Statistics reflect that many people wish to be sterilized.1' 4
When those who wish to be sterilized come up against the
forms, the delays, and the legitimate hesitation of the medical
profession, there is no question that a sterilization will be more
difficult to obtain.
Given the tack the Court and Congress have taken recently, restricting rights to federally funded abortion, the right
to obtain a sterilization should be as unimpeded as possible.
These regulations, by complicating access to sterilization,
make the right to sterilization fall victim to those who would
limit all reproductive choice. In addition, it seems legitimately
open to question whether the good produced from these regulations outweighs the invasion of privacy, the interference with
the doctor-patient relationship, and the risk and sometimes
absurd medical situations they will create.
Not only will the regulations adversely affect the exercise
of the right to an elective sterilization, but, by defining informed consent in relation to the procedure, they will influence
California civil tort law as well. Specifically, the regulations
will play a key role in medical malpractice actions growing out
of the sterilization procedure.
THE IMPACT OF THE REGULATIONS ON CIVIL TORT LAW

Battery Doctrine
Informed consent is most often referred to in terms of an
action in negligence. This has not always been the case. "" Lack
of consent in a cause of action against medical personnel can
be the basis of a battery action as well. Cobbs defined the
difference:
Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform
one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not
obtained, there is a clear case of battery ...
However, when an undisclosed potential complication
results, the occurrence of which was not an integral part
of the treatment procedure but merely a known risk, the
courts are divided on the issue of whether this should be
deemed to be battery or negligence. . . . [Tihe trend
appears to be towards categorizing failure to obtain informed consent as negligence.'
104.
105.
106.

See Westhoff & Jones, supra note 2.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 165-66 (4th ed. 1971).
8 Cal. 3d at 239-40, 502 P.2d at 7-8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12.
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The court stated that the battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented."" Given this definition, battery could be a logical cause of action in a case
involving lack of consent to a sterilization operation, particularly in those cases of alleged pressure and duress. Under a
battery theory, a doctor has no medical community standard
defense (the plaintiff must merely prove a touching, absent9
0 (s)he may be held liable for punitive damages;'1
consent);'1
and (s)he may not be covered by malpractice insurance because it is an intentional tort."9°
Negligence Actions
Negligence per se. Under a negligence theory, a physician
who fails to follow the regulations to the letter will be facing a
possible presumption of negligence per se arising under Evidence Code section 669.' Enacted in 1967 to codify existing
case law," ' the statute provides for a rebuttable presumption
of negligence from the violation of a statute, ordinance or
regulation of a public entity if such violation was the proximate
cause of a kind of injury which the statute was enacted to
prevent to a person in*a class which the statute was enacted to
protect.','
Id. at 240, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice,55 CAL.
L. REV. 1396 (1967).
111. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (West Supp. 1977).
112. Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958) (the basic statement.
of the negligence per se presumption).
113. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (West Supp. 1978) provides:
Failure to exercise due care
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or
property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature
which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or
property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was adopted.
(b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that:
(1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did
what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence,
acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law;
107.

---

A
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Most of the cases interpreting section 669 involve determinations on the elements, that is, proximate cause, specific injury and protected class. In the sterilization situation those
elements would be met. The sterilization regulations would
constitute regulations of a public entity.' 4 Lack of disclosure
of the sterilization itself or of a complication which subsequently occurred, would supply proximate cause for the
"injury" which is lack of informed consent. Clearly, the patients of doctors performing sterilizations are the class for
whose protection the regulations were adopted."'
The presumption of negligence per se can be rebutted by
proof that the physician acted in a manner that was reasonable
and justifiable under the circumstances."' At trial, since the
ultimate question is whether the physician was negligent,
rather than whether he or she violated the regulation, proof of
justification or excuse would negate the existence of negligence
instead of merely establishing an excuse for negligent conduct." 7 Justification is normally a jury question."'
Ability to justify a violation of the sterilization regulations
would vary with the situation. It would seem justifiable for a
physician to ignore the regulations when performing a hysterectomy on a postmenopausal woman or a prostate operation on
an eighty-year-old man. Reiterating the effectiveness of the
procedure in producing permanent sterilization and the anticipated results of permanent sterilization would be the classic
case of adding insult to injury in the case where a woman needs
a hysterectomy to cure a disease that has already made her
sterile. A physician might choose to streamline informed consent in a case where a patient is believed to be sterile already
(2) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation was a
child and exercised the degree of care ordinarily exercised by persons of
his maturity, intelligence, and capacity under similar circumstances, but
the presumption may not be rebutted by such proof if the violation occurred in the course of an activity normally engaged in only by adults and
requiring adult qualifications.
114. Most references are to cases involving safety regulations and orders of the
Public Utility Commission, but all such regulations are in the Administrative Code,
as are the sterilization regulations, and can certainly be viewed on the same level as
safety regulations. See generally Vallas v. City of Chula Vista, 56 Cal. App. 3d 382,
128 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1976); Levels v. Growers Ammonia Supply Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d
443, 121 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1975); Cade v. Mid-City Hospital Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 589,
119 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1975).
115. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
116. Id. § 669(b)(1).
117. CAL. EviD. CODE § 669, Comment (West Supp. 1978).
118. Fuentes v. Panella, 120 Cal. App. 2d 175, 260 P.2d 853 (1953).
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(perhaps from heavy radiation therapy for Hodgkins disease)." '
However, it is unknown how far a doctor could go in ignoring
the regulations and still be safe from a malpractice action.
Negligence. The regulations have defined what constitutes
informed consent to sterilization. That being the case, there is
no room for professional judgment as to what a particular patient should or should not be told. In fact, the regulations were
promulgated for the express purpose of removing such judgment from this one area.' 20 The regulations by their terms make
no provision for a professional judgment except to the extent
that the physician may expand on the already lengthy list of
necessary disclosures.' Therefore, the regulations leave very
little room for a "prudent" physician to manipulate within
them for the benefit of the patient or on behalf of a doctorpatient relationship.
Since the government has definitely outlined the legal
standard for informed consent to a sterilization, exact compliance with the regulations should absolve a physician of liability
in negligence as a matter of law. Practically speaking, it would
be difficult to prove that informed consent was lacking if the
entire regulatory litany had been complied with unless the
physician, taking such care to emphasize the sterilization, neglected some other complication which then befalls the patient.
In fact proponents argue protection of the doctor from malpractice suits as a benefit of the regulations.'2 2 This is small
comfort to physicians. The legal realities are presumptions of
negligence per se for technical violations but no conclusive way
to avoid liability by full compliance. Although compliance with
the regulations is claimed as a complete defense to a law suit,
there is no authority in California law for such a position. If
119. Brief for Plaintiff at 100, California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099
(Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 18, 1977) (declaration of Dan W. Clark, M.D.) (on file at
Santa Clara L. Rev.).
120. See B. Rosenfeld, S. Wolfe & R. McGarrah, supra note 36, at 33 (referred
to as paternalism or racial and ethnic bias rather than professional judgment).
121. Explanation must include, but is not limited to, those things enumerated
in CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 51305.3(f), 70707.3(f) (1977).
122. [See fact sheet on file at Public Advocates, Inc., San Francisco, Cal.]. The
seemingly unavoidable progression from negligence to strict liability has also surfaced
in the area of informed consent. One commentator advocates strict liability for informed consent based on a duty to warn theory. The article proposes that a hospitalemployed Information Director read a form such as "Standard Appendectomy Form"
and such procedure would act as a complete defense to a law suit based on informed
consent. That comment is made without authority. Maldonado, Strict Liability and
Informed Consent: "Don't Say I Didn't Tell You So! ", 9 AKRON L. REv. 609, 610, 62427 (1976).
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there is any truism in California law, it is that negligence is a
question of law for the jury.' 3 In cases involving safety regulations the courts have made it clear that compliance does not
absolve the charge of negligence, only the charge of negligence
per se.' 24
The crucial question is what the executed consent form is
worth if an action is brought against a physician based on lack
of consent to a sterilization operation or any procedure resulting in sterilization. A signed consent form has rarely protected
a physician.'1 Such forms have often been repudiated by patients who claim they did not remember signing the form or
that they did not understand the form or that the form was
signed under duress because they were ill.121 One study has
documented the fact that patients may not recall accurately a
major portion of what they are told even though they have
completely understood at the time and given a truly informed
consent.'27
Even if physicians keep careful records, the written consent form signed by the patient will not defeat an action based
on lack of informed consent. 28 As one authority on medical
malpractice has stated:
Because of the overly broad language used in a consent
form, and because of the less than ideal circumstances
under which the instrument is frequently signed, it is the
author's opinion that written consent bears little relation
to the true "free and informed consent" desired of the
patient, and that the written consent merely should be
considered as one item of evidence in the total physicianpatient relationship on the issue of authority for treat123. Florez v. Groom Development Co., 53 Cal. 2d 347, 348 P.2d 200, 1 Cal. Rptr.
840 (1959); Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal. 2d 225, 282 P.2d 69
(1955); Borland v. Key System Transit Co., 205 Cal. 153, 270 P. 194 (1928).
124. Nevis v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 626, 275 P.2d 761 (1954) (compliance with general orders of the Public Utilities Commission does not establish due
care as a matter of law but merely relieves it of the charge of negligence per se); Barnes
v. Blue Haven Pools, 1 Cal. App. 3d 123, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1969) (it is elementary
that compliance with applicable laws does not establish due care as a matter of law);
Perrine v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 442, 9 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1960) (one
may act in strict conformity with governmental safety regulations and yet not exercise
the amount of care which is required under the circumstances).
125. Katz, Informed Consent: Is It Bad Medicine?, 126 WEST. J. MED. 426, 42628 (May, 1977).
126. Id.
127. MED. WoRLD NEws 26 (Nov. 4, 1976).

128. D.

HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

§ 2.4 (1973).
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ment,29 with its importance being weighted by the0 trier of
fact.1

Because the sterilization consent forms under the regulations
are not overly broad in their language and the consent process
itself is safeguarded to prevent duress, a properly executed
Sterilization Consent Document should operate as a rebuttable
presumption that the physician obtained the informed consent
30
of the patient.
In any event, by limiting the flexibility involved in the
traditional informed consent procedure, the regulations make
it difficult for a physician to predict what effect an attempt to
deviate from the regulations will have. This measure of uncertainty with regards to potential tort liability may make physicians reluctant to perform elective sterilizations. In addition,
the danger that liability will flow from a deviation reduces the
likelihood that physicians will attempt to tailor their medical
advice. This could conceivably result in a corresponding lowering of the quality of services a sterilization patient receives.
CONCLUSION

Arguments go both ways on how these regulations affect
the fundamental right to decide whether or not to bear children. This author recognizes that just as that right should not
be burdened, neither should it be denied. The woman who is
sterilized without fully understanding what is happening is
being deprived of her constitutional right. However, the woman
who desires a sterilization faces undue burdens because of
these regulations, and she too has a constitutional right burdened. Overall this will result in more difficulty in obtaining
sterilizations, an increasingly favored method of family planning.
In attempting to define exactly what constitutes informed
consent to a voluntary sterilization, the regulations have created potential situations of greater medical risk and tremendous bureaucratic hassle. While guaranteeing the protection of
129. Id. § 2.2(B).
130. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22 § 70707.7(a) (1977) provides that for the purposes
of the hospital's compliance with the regulations, the signature of the patient, the
physician, the physician's designee (if any) and the auditor-witness (if applicable) on
the Sterilization Consent Document shall be sufficient evidence that the informed
consent procedure has taken place. However, this says nothing about the compliancec
of the physician and the corresponding section involving Medi-Cal makes no mention
of it either.
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one legal right, that of informed consent, other medical and
legal rights are being infringed upon.
The regulations are a burden on patients and doctors and
a direct interference in the doctor-patient relationship. Nothing is left to professional judgment nor are allowances made for
the infinite variations in human physiology and psychology.
Although carefully developed, the regulations nevertheless are
arbitrary and allow little discretion in doctor or patient. While
we are long past the paternalistic era of doctors' making our
decisions for us, we have not reached the point, and hopefully
never will, where a standardized form can capably handle the
very personal dealings doctors have with patients. Medicine
is not an exact science and cannot be reduced to a form which
leaves no room for professional judgment. Patients are not well
served by implying that an a) through f). standardized form
tells them all they need to know.
Traditional informed consent requirements developed by
California case law should adequately cover the sterilization
situation as well as any other. Its parameters, while based on
reasonable disclosure, allow variations for different situations;
the regulations do not. The regulations potentially cover a myriad of diverse medical procedures in a number of different medical specialities and try to dictate in eight pages what physicians are supposed to say to their patients in all of those circumstances. In this regard, the rigid structure of the regulations flies in the face of common sense.
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of all is that poor
women who claim to have been the victims of pressure from the
medical profession to be sterilized will be the very ones subjected to the problems inherent in the regulations. Enmeshed
more completely in the problems of day to day living, a poor
woman has less time and energy to devote to logical, orderly,
and sequential medical care. The burden of her existence
makes her the most likely one to miss the deadlines imposed
by the regulations. Having faced bureaucratic difficulties and
failing to get sterilized, she may then face a later, undesired
pregnancy which may not be terminated under legislation to
deny government funds for abortions. This cannot be a desirable result.
Marlene H. Prendergast

